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13 How Do Climate Change and Energy-Related
Partnerships Impact Innovation and Technology
Transfer?: Some Lessons for the Implementation
of the UN Sustainable Development Goals
Ayşem Mert and Philipp Pattberg
Introduction
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) – that is, networks among different societal actors,
including governments, international organizations, companies, research institutions,
and civil society organizations – have been widely endorsed and applied across a number
of global public policy arenas, from health to climate change. For example, in 2000,
former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact, a
voluntary partnership between corporations and the United Nations (UN). More recently,
PPPs have been discussed as a major implementation mechanism for the UN’s ambitious
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and its related Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).1 Furthermore, partnerships now also form an integral part
of the non-state action agenda on climate change.2 In the words of former UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon, “[a]ddressing global challenges requires a collective and con-
certed effort, involving all actors. Through partnerships and alliances, and by pooling
comparative advantages, we increase our chances of success.”3
Partnerships for sustainable development emerged as voluntary cooperative arrange-
ments between governments and non-state actors to address specific sustainability goals.
They were promoted, particularly at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustain-
able Development (WSSD), where PPPs clearly emerged as an alternative governance
mechanism to the traditional intergovernmental agreements and diplomatic processes,
which the Summit failed to produce. Since then, PPPs have become widespread, if
not the dominant mode of governance in various issue areas, particularly in the trans-
national climate, energy, and sustainability policies.4 For example, the United Nations
1 Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/trans
formingourworld. In particular, SDG 9 exhorts member states to “[b]uild resilient infrastructure, promote
inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation” and SDG 13 specifically urges them to
“[t]ake urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.”
2 Sander Chan et al., Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive Framework for Effective
Nonstate Action, 6 Global Pol’y 466–473 (2015).
3
United Nations Office for Partnerships, nonwww.un.org/partnerships/.
4 We understand the transnational level as involving at least one non-state actor involved in cross-border
governance, whereas the global level involves nation-states and/or non-state actors engaging in activities that
focus on worldwide governance. Thus, global can refer to either transnational governance and/or to more
traditional initiatives via public sector and inter-governmental regulatory regimes.
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Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) has over 330 registered initiatives
(largely overlapping with the sample discussed later in this chapter). In the 2012 Rio+20
Summit, over seven hundred voluntary arrangements were added to the list of similar
voluntary arrangements. Launched in early 2016, UN’s Partnerships for SDGs database
has 2,088 registered initiatives, and the international cooperative initiatives (so-called
ICIs) that are emerging in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris Agreement are also growing
rapidly. These operate beyond the auspices of the UNFCCC and are driven by smaller
groups of like-minded countries, often including companies, NGOs, academia, inter-
national organizations and sub-national public actors such as cities.
Despite their memetic success, the role and relevance of these partnerships remain
contested. Some observers view the new emphasis on PPPs as problematic, since volun-
tary public–private governance arrangements might privilege more powerful actors5
in particular those located in the so-called global North, comprised almost entirely of
industrialized countries. In addition, these arrangements arguably consolidate the privat-
ization of governance and dominant neo-liberal modes of globalization,6 wherein insti-
tutions are installed but neither governance deficits are addressed nor public goods
procured.7 Some also argue that partnerships lack accountability and democratic legit-
imacy.8 By contrast, others see PPPs as a governance innovation that addresses various
deficits of inter-state politics by bringing together key actors across the public, private,
and nonprofit sectors.9 While some scholars regard governance deficits as a generic
phenomenon in international relations,10 others focus on a particular governance deficit
such as the democratic deficit and problems of legitimacy,11 the implementation defi-
cit, or the regulatory deficit impacting global regimes such as global climate change
regulation.
Despite these critiques and observations, PPPs are relevant for the governance of
climate change and energy, and the related challenge of technology transfer for the
following reasons. As a descriptive matter, in the follow-up to the 2015 Paris Agreement,
transnational non-governmental actors have become a main provider of public goods and
policies. Since then, the economic and discursive transformations in climate politics
have consistently been focused around the steering and orchestrating powers of the states
and inter-state system, which enable collaborations of non-state actors with sub-state
5 Verena Bitzer et al., Intersectoral Partnerships for a Sustainable Coffee Chain: Really Addressing Sustain-
ability or Just Picking (Coffee) Cherries?, 18 Global Envtl. Change 271–284 (2008); Karlijn Morsink
et al., Multi-stakeholder Partnerships for Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies, 39 Energy
Pol’y 1–5 (2011).
6 Marina Ottaway, Corporation Goes Global: International Organizations, Nongovernmental Organization
Networks, and Transnational Business, 7 Global Governance 265–292 (2001).
7 Ayşem Mert, The Privatisation of Environmental Governance: On Myths, Forces of Nature, and other
Inevitabilities, 21 Envtl. Values 475–498 (2012).
8 James Meadowcroft, Who is in Charge Here? Governance for Sustainable Development in a Complex
World, 9 J. Envtl. Pol’y & Plan. 299–314 (2007); Ayşem Mert, Environmental Governance
Through Partnerships: A Discourse Theoretical Study 230–249 (2015).
9 See generally Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government?
(1998); Charlotte Streck, New Partnerships in Global Environmental Policy: The Clean Development
Mechanism, 13 J. Env’t & Dev. 295–322 (2004).
10 Peter Haas, When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructive Approach to the Policy Process, 11 J. Eur.
Pub. Pol’y 569–592 (2004).
11 Karin Bäckstrand, Democratizing Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 12 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 467–498 (2006).
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agents and communities. Secondly, PPPs are intended to facilitate the provision of global
public goods.12 Relatedly, individual partners may lack full global, regional, or regulatory
authority to reach their aims; therefore, the provision of goods or services depends on a
coalition of social forces. Consequently, by involving various stakeholders, the promise of
partnerships is to produce public goods with more consensus and participation. In this
context, the supervision, oversight, and liability emerge as critical issues for PPP research-
ers to investigate further.
In the context of this chapter, we understand the relationship between partnerships
and intellectual property rights (IPRs) as part of a broader inquiry relating to technology
transfer and institutional innovation. First, we examine whether climate and energy-
related partnerships focus on technical implementation of existing technologies, tech-
nology transfer, knowledge dissemination, and/or innovation. Then we analyse their
success in tackling the problems they were set up to tackle. To achieve this end, the
chapter draws on a multi-year research project on the emergence and effectiveness of
PPPs for sustainable development that utilizes a large database, the Global Sustainability
Partnerships Database (GSPD), to understand better the role and relevance of PPPs in
contemporary global environmental governance.13 The empirical focus in this chapter is
on partnerships focusing on climate change and/or energy.
The chapter first defines partnerships as a case of network governance and briefly
discusses the origins of partnerships for sustainable development. We then provide an
overview of the status of technology innovation and technology transfer in multilateral
environmental governance. This provides important context for the next section, an
empirical analysis of the performance of PPPs in the climate and energy sub-field. Three
findings from our study are particularly noteworthy. First, neither technological nor
social innovation is a dominant function of climate and energy partnerships, despite
the transformative potential of such innovations for sustainability. Second, even accept-
ing any stakeholder from a developing country as representative of the poor countries,
significant issues pertain to the democratic legitimacy of individual partnerships, the
technologies transferred, the resulting innovation regimes, and their overall orchestra-
tion by the UNCSD. Third, the climate and energy partnerships surveyed here show
alarmingly low levels of potential effectiveness. After these findings are presented and
supported, the chapter concludes with lessons learned and suggestions for improving
partnerships as an instrument of change as envisioned by the 2030 Agenda.
I PPPs and the Transformation of World Politics:
Context and Definitions
A Partnerships as Networks
Environmental policy, both domestic and international, traditionally falls under the
authority of the government. However, in recent years, this state-centric conception
of environmental governance is increasingly contested. Scholars have highlighted the
12 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in Global Public Goods: International
Cooperation in the 21st Century 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
13 See generally Public–private partnerships for Sustainable Development: Emergence, Influence
and Legitimacy (Philip Pattberg et al. eds., 2012).
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transformation of a territorial-based global order to one of multiple spheres of authority
in flexible and issue-specific arrangements.14 Mirroring debates about the organiza-
tional transformation of the modern nation state, theorists of international relations have
begun to reflect on the changing nature of the state system itself.15 One central empirical
observation is the emergence of networked forms of organization that operate under a
different logic compared to other ideal types of social organization, such as markets and
hierarchies.16 Whereas in the domestic context network governance has been discussed
as a complementary and gradual innovation of older forms of policy making (for
example, corporatism), networks at the transnational and global level have been largely
conceptualized as new forms of governance that would overcome the limitations of
traditional top-down intergovernmental policy making.17
Within the field of political science, broadly speaking, networks are understood as
interactions of organizational actors. Consequently, the concept of policy networks refers
to the production of public policies through a relatively stable and defined interaction
of actors within a policy field. Policy networks are analysed as polycentric governance
arrangements that integrate the competing interests of actors within a horizontal struc-
ture. This conceptualization stands in contrast to older conceptions, according to which
the formulation and implementation of public policies are the sole responsibility of
governments (in their attempt to transform the preferences of voters into adequate
political programs) and the organized interests of non-state actors are recognized only
insofar as they address the public decision-making process.
The policy network approach reflects the transformation of policy making in modern
societies. It analyses the emergence of network governance as a reaction to a number of
interconnected trends, including neo-liberal globalization and the resulting narratives
that identify public and private interests, the increase in sub-systemic autonomy within
the formerly monolithic nation state, the increasingly versatile demands from the state
resulting in more state functions and its accompanying bureaucracies, as well as the
growth and further differentiation of civil society.
Public–private partnerships as a form of network governance are by no means a novel
phenomenon. Before taking centre stage in scholarship on global governance and inter-
national relations in the early 2000s, PPPs enjoyed sustained attention in the domestic
policy context, in particular in health and infrastructure. PPPs were actively promoted as
an instrument to increase governance effectiveness as part of the “New Public Manage-
ment” paradigm of the early 1980s. Since the 1990s, PPPs have also been promoted at
the international level as instruments for good governance and deliberative democracy,
14 James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbu-
lent World 467 (1997); Philipp Pattberg & Johannes Stripple, Beyond the Public and Private Divide:
Remapping Transnational Climate Governance in the 21st Century, 8 Int’l Envtl. Agreements: Pol.,
L. & Econ. 367–388 (2008).
15 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 Int’l
Org. 391–425 (1992); Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for
International Order and Governance, in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in
World Politics 58 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
16 Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism, 2010 Wisc. L. Rev. 227, 232 (2010).
17 Tanja A. Börzel, Organizing Babylon – On the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks, 76 Pub. Admin.
253–273 (1998); see also Margaret Chon, PPPs in Global IP (public–private partnerships in global
intellectual property), in Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property 296 (Graeme
B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013).
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with the additional aim to increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of multilateral
policies. Mirroring many aspects of the debate about new public management at the
domestic level, the concept of network governance has been recently transferred to the
global level. The appropriateness of the network approach in this context is frequently
justified by referring to the changing capacity of states to govern effectively under the
constraints of de-nationalization and accelerating globalization.18 However, the growing
literature on PPPs suffers from conceptual confusion, rival definitions, disparate research
traditions, and oftentimes an implicit normative and value-laden agenda of promoting
partnerships. This state of conceptual vagueness has led some scholars to question the
usefulness of the concept and to dismiss the term PPP as empty and misleading19. While
the conceptual broadness of this key term, with its multiple uses, has hampered know-
ledge accumulation on the subject, it has not prevented a diverse literature on PPPs as
novel global governance instruments. Partnerships, both national and transnational, have
been analysed as hybrid governance arrangements for the provision of collective goods
that contribute to the transformation of political authority from government and public
actors towards non-state actors, such as business and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)20.
In this chapter, we build upon a scholarly tradition that understands public–private,
multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development as a form of global govern-
ance beyond traditional forms of international cooperation. Most scholars agree on
several features that constitute PPPs.21 Important characteristics include:
– transnationality (involving cross-border interactions and non-state relations);
– public policy objectives (as opposed to public bads or exclusively private goods); and
– a network structure (coordination by participating actors rather than coordination by
a central hierarchy).
While this common understanding is quite narrow, it still covers a wide range of
phenomena. For example, the functions of partnerships are varied and include agenda
setting, rule-making and standard setting, advocacy, implementation, and service provi-
sion.22 Furthermore, PPPs appear in different sectors such as sustainable development,
health, human rights development, security, and finance. They vary in degree of insti-
tutionalization and permanence. In the public health sector, as described by several
chapters in this volume, partnerships have enabled greater accessibility of treatments
at lower prices. Finally, partnerships have different geographical scopes from the local,
national, and regional, to the global level.
18 Michael Zürn, Regieren Jenseits des Nationalstaates (1998); The Emergence of Private Author-
ity in Global Governance 1–248 (Rodney B. Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002).
19 Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Public–Private Partnerships: Perspectives on Purposes,
Publicness, and Good Governance, 31 Pub. Admin. and Dev. 2–14 (2011).
20 Marco Schäferhoff et al., Transnational Public–Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making
Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results, 11 Int’l Stud. Rev. 451–474, 455 (2009); Pattberg
& Stripple, supra note 14.
21 Schäferhoff, supra note 20, at 455.
22 Jens Marten, Multi-stakeholder Partnerships-Future Models of Multilateralism?, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung: Occasional Papers Berlin (January 2007), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04244.pdf; See
generally Benedicte Bull & Desmond McNeill, Development issues in global governance: public-
private partnerships and market multilateralism (2007).
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B The Origins of WSSD Partnerships in Environmental Governance
Partnerships for sustainable development were defined as “voluntary multi-stakeholder
initiatives, which contribute to the implementation of inter-governmental commitments”
in Agenda 21, as well as in the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21
and in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. A set of guidelines (the Bali Guiding
Principles) were developed, defining partnerships within the UN system.23 The defini-
tions of partnerships as voluntary implementation instruments as well as the Bali Guide-
lines were both agreed upon in the preparatory process to the 2002 WSSD.24 These
negotiations involved not only delegates and UN representatives, but also non-state
actors. The resulting conceptualization was a compromise; the guidelines were non-
binding criteria that lacked screening, monitoring, or reporting procedures. No central
body was designated to oversee the evolving partnerships regime. Nonetheless, partner-
ships became an official part of the UN environmental governance system once they
were accepted as an official outcome of the WSSD, despite opposition from several
major groups (particularly environmental NGOs and trade unions) and country delega-
tions (particularly those from poor countries).
Although the term partnership can be found in UN documents at least since 1992,
partnerships were only considered as an official outcome of an intergovernmental process
in the preparatory phase of the WSSD, because pressure to produce a concrete deliver-
able at the WSSD in Johannesburg was mounting.25 Shortly after the United Nations
Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) proposed non-binding out-
comes in the form of partnerships as a possible outcome, “the US expressed appreciation
for [them] and called for “space” at the WSSD to allow for related dialogues.”26 The
concept had earlier been developed by UNDESA to increase NGO involvement and
reflect on a past decade of environmental governance. But most importantly, partnerships
were meant to break through existing donor fatigue: as reported by one UNDESA repre-
sentative, “[e]very responsibility was being put at the feet of the governments. There was
a strong push that this [responsibility to implement] should be shared.”27
During the run-up to the WSSD conference, the United States and business and
industry representatives explicitly supported a vaguely defined partnership process, which
raised suspicions with NGO and other country representatives. The issues were numer-
ous: for instance, European Union delegations and environmental NGOs were worried
that partnerships could become an instrument to repudiate international environmental
agreements. Another concern of the NGO community was the increasing business
involvement in the UN and the expected green-/blue-washing of corporate activities.
Some delegations had started to perceive partnerships as a threat to their sovereignty.
23 United Nations Brochure, Partnerships for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. DPI/2323 — 03–46703
(August 2003), www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/publications/brochure_E.pdf. The Bali Guiding Prin-
ciples are criteria that guide the formation of the UNCSD partnerships agreed at the Fourth Preparatory
Committee Meeting to the WSSD, in Bali (27 May–7 June 2002).
24 The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD or Earth Summit 2002) took place in Johan-
nesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002.
25 The final decision of PrepCom IV mentions partnerships as “events” to take place before the summit.
26 Earth Negotiations Bulletin- Summary of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, International Institute for Substantial Development (Feb
11, 2002) www.iisd.ca/vol22/enb2219e.html.
27 Interview with a UNDESA representative at the time of the WSSD in New York (May 2007).
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Developing country delegations (particularly China, Indonesia, and Malaysia) had
become increasingly worried about the possibility that developmental projects within
their national borders would pick and choose which international or national NGOs
to work with. As a result, some delegations raised questions about non-state actor
participation.
The framework that was ultimately negotiated was meant to address various govern-
mental concerns in order to make partnerships an agreeable outcome to all parties
involved. The resulting Bali Guidelines establish the framework that guides the arrange-
ment and registration of partnerships with the UNCSD. These guidelines consisted of
conflicting visions regarding the role, function, and nature of partnerships; while warning
about potential negative effects, they failed to address and avoid them28. For instance,
PPPs were to complement inter-governmental agreements, but the Summit failed to
produce any binding agreements, even on the most pressing issues such as climate
change, or biodiversity governance. It was not clear whether their main goal was to
address the implementation deficit, or to create more participatory processes. By listing
various expectations in their framing, the guidelines depicted sustainability partnerships
in an ideal form, almost impossible to reach with their actual capacity. Most importantly,
the partnerships process remained non-binding. Because they were not accompanied by
a strong screening process or a monitoring mechanism, effective implementation of
sustainability principles was unlikely.
Thus in the various preparatory meetings for the WSSD, partnerships were defined,
negotiated, and re-constructed such that they would be acceptable to all parties involved.
In this process, conflicts about who the relevant stakeholders are (inclusive or not of
businesses and NGOs), what the aim of partnerships should be (implementation versus
participation), and how they should be screened and monitored were not addressed head-
on. Nonetheless, with the Bali Guidelines, partnerships have been defined as voluntary
multi-stakeholder initiatives to achieve the sustainability goals agreed upon through the
inter-governmental system. One of the main expectations from these new governance
mechanisms was to create win-win situations wherein the interests of all actors would be
served. This has already made partnerships desirable for most parties, because staying
outside of these networks meant ‘not to win.’
Social innovation is at the heart of global environmental governance and it is also
intricately related to sustainability partnerships. Various academic disciplines have
recently studied this relationship29 revealing how the UN’s focus on partnership and
technology transfer as major sustainability goals prioritizes a particular type of partnership
and innovation over others. For instance, partnerships have been regarded as a social and
legal innovation of transnational governance since Agenda 21, as they allow for stake-
holder involvement, and address the participation deficit. However, there are various
complications in the implementation of this principle: The participation principle is only
nominally operative in partnerships. Having a local partner from a recipient country is
28 Ayşem Mert, Hybrid Governance Mechanisms as Political Instruments: The Case of Sustainability, Partner-
ships, 14 Int’l Envtl. Agreements 225–244 (2013).
29 John D. Wolpert, Breaking Out of the Innovation Box, 80 Harv. Bus. Rev. 76–83 (2002);
John Adeoti et al., Biotechnology R&D Partnership for Industrial Innovation in Nigeria, 25 Technova-
tion 349–365 (2005); Dominique Kleyn, et al., Partnership and Innovation in the Life Sciences, 11 Int’l
j. Innovation Mgmt. 323–330 (2007).
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regarded as sufficient condition to deem the partnership democratic, even though this
does not ensure the social acceptability of the technologies transferred. Furthermore, any
stakeholder from a developing country can represent recipient countries, even if this
partner has no connection to the communities in question. The UN narratives on
innovation and partnerships do not ensure legitimate participation practices, and in
extreme cases they assume a false singularity of opinion among all stakeholders in a
community, all communities in a country, or across countries. In sum, technology
transfer in sustainable development potentially results in partnerships that reflect the
already existing power inequalities, making innovation work for those who have some-
thing to offer: “If you don’t have some money on the table, some time, and expertise, you
are not a partner.”30
II Technology Transfer in Multilateral Environmental Governance
One of the earliest references to the role of IPRs in environmental governance is made in
Agenda 21, a non-binding, voluntarily implemented action plan for sustainable develop-
ment, adopted by more than 178 governments at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janerio, in 1992 (the Rio Summit).31
These references can be found in a chapter devoted to Transfer of Environmentally
Sound Technology, Cooperation and Capacity-building.32 In this context, the transfer of
technology and access to state-of-the-art technologies is regarded as a significant goal for
sustainable development, for all countries. This foundational text foreshadows the dom-
inant framing of IPRs in environmental governance. Technology transfer is central to this
framing, which can be summarised as follows:
– It is recognised that “international business is an important vehicle for technology
transfer,” and advised that the power of such knowledge should be combined with
“local innovations to generate alternative technologies.”33
– The underlying necessity for technology transfer is explained as to enable developing
countries “to make more rational technology choices,” which can be achieved by
providing access to technologies selected by the global North.34
– IPRs are regarded as rights that need protecting from abuse (mentioned three times).35
30 Kent Buse, Governing Public–Private Infectious Disease Partnerships, 10 Brown J. World Aff. 232,
225–242 (2004).
31 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Rio
Summit, Rio Conference, and Earth Summit) was a major United Nations conference held in Rio de
Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992.
32 U.N. Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements, U.N. Agenda 21 Chapter 34 } 11, www.un-
documents.net/agenda21.htm [hereinafter UN Documents]. IPRs are also mentioned elsewhere, for
instance in the decisions following the Montreal Protocol of 1987 in a generic fashion, but are not
decided upon in these contexts. See United Nations Environment Programme – Ozone Secretariat,
Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, UNEP/
Earthprint (2006).
33 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 11.
34 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 12.
35 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 18. The document does not determine, however, what the threat is or
from where it originates.
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– In order to promote and support “access to transfer of technology” to developing
countries, Agenda 21 sets the goal of facilitating and financing “environmentally
sound technologies and corresponding know-how, [. . .] on favourable terms, includ-
ing on concessional and preferential terms [. . .] for the implementation of Agenda 21,”
and “to promote long-term technological partnerships between holders of environ-
mentally sound technologies and potential users.”36
– In terms of policy measures, the suggested action is the Northern countries to purchase
the necessary patents and licences “on commercial terms for their transfer to develop-
ing countries on non-commercial terms as part of development cooperation” or even
to promote acquisition through compulsory licensing to prevent their abuse.37
– Finally, regarding the management of technology transfer, it is emphasised that “the
possibility of assigning this activity to already existing regional organizations should be
fully explored before creating entirely new institutions, and funding of this activity
through public–private partnerships should also be explored, as appropriate.”38
The main aim of the various texts produced at the 1992 Rio Summit was to consolidate
the ideological premises of sustainable development across the globe. The political
function of Agenda 21, in particular, was to translate the global goals agreed upon at
the Rio Summit into blueprints for local and national policy. To do this, it was critical to
assure the private sector that the devices through which corporations exerted power (e.g.,
patents, liberal trade regimes, and commitment to growth) would not be threatened by
the newly emerging sustainability regimes. Framing the roles of IPRs and technology
transfer in this fashion allowed for a harmonious resolution of the contradictory goals of
infinite economic growth with ecological limits. On the one hand, the technological
know-how would be shared with the so-called developing countries through mechanisms
such as compulsory licensing, which is an arguably bold and unprecedented reference in
an international environmental text. On the other hand, various agencies and organiza-
tions in the international system were to be mobilised so that the property regimes would
not be challenged by this action.
Following the Rio Summit, the role of IPRs in technology transfer was framed accord-
ingly in both trade and environmental negotiations. The general framing of IPRs was
fixed to the logic of IPRs’ “dual role” in (i) fostering sustainability-focused technological
innovation and (ii) its transfer.39 Furthermore, the 1995 agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) sets the objective that “the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of tech-
nological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner condu-
cive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”40
36 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 14.
37 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 18.
38 UN Documents, supra note 32, at } 26.
39 Ahmed Abdel-Latif et al., Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate Change at the
UNFCCC: A Way Forward (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Policy Brief
No. 11, 2011), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2480.
40 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (April 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Result of the Uruguay
Rounds 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
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Agenda 21 itself does not provide an explicit blueprint to achieve this ambitious
mixture of policy goals with regard to technological innovation and transfer, but rather
suggests the prioritisation of the existing inter-governmental institutions and the explora-
tion of PPPs as another means of policy implementation. Thus, the link between partner-
ships and IPRs was established at the same time as the founding of United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and as sustainable develop-
ment was becoming the dominant discourse in global environmental governance. This
point is important in understanding how partnerships have become a highly visible and
highly discussed element of global sustainability governance.
As noted in the previous section, transnational PPPs have multiplied, especially since
the 2002 Johannesburg Summit. And recently they have become an official action point
for the UN in the context of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), with SDG #17
aiming to “revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.”41 In policy and
academic debates alike, partnerships are promoted as solutions to deadlocked intergov-
ernmental negotiations, ineffective treaties, overly bureaucratic international organiza-
tions, and many other real or perceived problems of regulatory coordination among states.
Since their conception, partnerships have become a political process wherein opposing
rationales are simultaneously upheld, whether the political rationales of the left and right,
or the economic rationales of public and private42. However, systematic evidence of the
impacts of transnational PPPs is scarce and the broader consequences of outsourcing and
privatizing global and transnational environmental governance are not well understood.
Most importantly, the strategy of introducing partnerships as a policy solution to conflict-
ing interests and goals has not been assessed in a systematic fashion.
To summarize, there are two problems emerging from the particular way partnerships
emerged around technology transfer issues: First, it reinforced the highly selective and
partial relationship between innovation and international mandates, which has been
observed also in TRIPS and the CBD43: Already in 1993, the Bellagio Declaration noted
that those “who do not fit this model –custodians of tribal culture and medical know-
ledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators
of valuable seed varieties, for example–are denied intellectual property protection.”44
Secondly, the win-win narrative, often used to legitimate PPPs, can have questionable
and undesirable consequences.45 Specifically, it prioritizes two issues on the UN’s devel-
opment agenda: The first one was institutional mainstreaming across the globe, a “one
size fits all” solution regardless of historical differences. This was neatly named insti-
tutional capacity building, suggesting a lack in some places vis-à-vis others. The second
issue was technology development and transfer. In a globalizing world, where capital and
41 Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 17: Revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Develop-
ment, U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs (Sept.29, 2017), www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/global
partnerships/.
42 See generally Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, Partnerships: Machines of Possibilities (2008).
43 Eric Deibel & Ayşem Mert, Partnerships and Miracle Crops: On Open Access and the Commodification of
Plant Varieties, 16 Asian Biotechnology and Dev. Rev., 1–33 (2014).
44 Statement of the Bellagio Conference on Cultural Agency/Cultural Authority: Politics and Poetics of
Intellectual Property in the Post-Colonial Era, IPCA (March 11, 1993) http://case.edu/affil/sce/Bellagio
Dec.html [hereinafter Bellagio Statement].
45 Ayşem Mert, Environmental Governance Through Partnerships: A Discourse Theoretical
Study 230–249 (2015).
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resources were regarded as flexible and transferable across markets, the sphere of environ-
mental conservation provided a puzzling impediment: the most accessible ‘resources’ for
energy production for the historically impoverished countries were the fossil fuels. Their
governments now argued for their sovereign rights on these resources, which resulted in a
fragmented climate/energy governance and difficult climate negotiations. With their
win-win strategies, partnerships (in principle) would reduce the poverty levels in these
areas by providing them with certain specific technologies. In return, the so-called
developing countries would become testing grounds or resource providers or perhaps
simply open their markets to some new products or technologies of the North.
This is not to suggest that the win-win solutions always work against the recipients.
Many partnerships do introduce technologies that are necessary and needed by the
communities that are on the receiving side of the transfer. Particularly when diverse sets
of local stakeholders are involved, partnerships seem to find the most appropriate tech-
nologies that give communities more autonomy in its use and maintenance.46 Examples
of such technology transfer projects include the re-/introduction of indigenous technolo-
gies or water harvesting techniques to increase the resilience of communities at risk.
The point remains, however, that corporate involvement often assumes a neutral, if
not benevolent, role to achieve the SDGs (and their predecessor Millennium Devel-
opment Goals). Technology transfer is a central part of this image but it should not be
taken for granted. For instance, many partnerships operate as platforms for controversial
technologies allowing for a rebranding of nuclear energy, PVC, water purification
chemicals, and so on.47 Some instances of such involvement include Dow Chemical’s
sponsoring the Blue Planet Run to “bring safe drinking water to 1.2 billion people”
(UNOP 2010), Coca Cola Foundation and Procter and Gamble both promoting not
only a water disinfectant but also behavioural techniques directed towards improved
hygiene in water deprived poor countries, or Royal Dutch Shell’s membership in the
Clean Air Initiative to enhance air quality in Asian cities.48
With this important background and context, the next section turns to our empirical
findings.
III Empirical Analysis of WSSD Partnerships
In this section, we utilize a multi-year research project on the emergence and effective-
ness of PPPs for sustainable development and the corresponding large database, the
Global Sustainability Partnerships Database (GSPD) to understand the role and rele-
vance of public–private partnerships in contemporary global environmental governance.
The empirical analysis focuses on two sets of questions. First, we ask whether partnerships
working on climate change and energy address issues of innovation and technology
transfer in developing countries. For this to be the case, climate and energy partnerships
would likely (i) implement on-the-ground projects that aim to transfer technology or
46 Ayşem Mert & Eleni Dellas, Assessing the Legitimacy of Technology Transfer Through Partnerships for
Sustainable Development in the Water Sector, in Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable
Development: Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy 209 (Philip Pattberg et al. eds., 2012).
47 Mert, supra note 28; Mert and Dellas, supra note 46.
48 CAI-Asia, Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (2010).
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produce/disseminate knowledge; (ii) in poorer countries; (iii) with stakeholders from
both rich and poor countries; (iv) and have legally binding contracts between partners.
Second, we scrutinize the overall effectiveness of climate change and energy partner-
ships. To do this, we use the GSPD, which was developed between 2006 and 2009 at the
Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam. Based on data provided
by the UNCSD, extensive desk studies, and numerous expert interviews, the GSPD
provides information on descriptive categories such as partnership name, existence of
website, number of countries in which partnerships implement their activities, number
of and type of partners, type of lead partners, area of policy implementation and functions
performed, geographical scope, duration, date of establishment, and resources reported
to be required for each of the 330 partnerships registered with the UNCSD at the time
the coding was completed in 2009. In addition, the GSPD also contains information
about individual partnership output, that is, the concrete activities and programmes of
partnerships for sustainable development. All data was coded by a team of researchers for
whom an inter-rater reliability check has been performed. This chapter focuses on the
general sample and the selection of partnerships that focus on climate and energy related
goals of global sustainability governance.
The GSPD thus focuses on two effectiveness-related dependent variables: global
governance deficits and function-output fit. We briefly explain these two concepts: The
assessment of the overall effectiveness and influence of the partnership regime is based
on three hypothetical global governance deficits49 that partnerships are supposed to
address: the regulatory deficit, the implementation deficit, and participatory deficit. First,
partnerships are expected to confront the regulatory deficit in current sustainability
governance by providing avenues for cooperation and joint problem-solving in areas
where intergovernmental regulation is largely non-existent. A second deficit that partner-
ships are believed to fill is an implementation deficit in sustainability governance. That
is, partnerships could help implement intergovernmental regulations that do exist but
that are only poorly implemented, if at all. Third, partnerships are often expected to assist
in solving a participation deficit in global governance. In this view, intergovernmental
negotiations are seen as dominated by powerful governments and international organiza-
tions, while partnerships, by contrast, might ensure higher participation of less privileged
actors, including voices from youth, the poor, women, indigenous people, and civil
society at large. Increased participation from such groups is viewed as needed to improve
the implementation of international agreements and to strengthen the overall legitimacy,
accountability, and democratic quality of current governance systems.
After assessing whether PPPs contribute to addressing existing governance deficits, the
GSPD was also constructed to evaluate function-output fit, i.e., the fit between a concrete
function performed by a partnership and the output it creates (i.e., measurable results
such as organizing training programs, publishing reports, developing curricula, and/or
building infrastructure). While a more direct assessment of impacts would be preferable,
no such assessments currently exist due to the methodological challenges involved.
However, by comparing what the partnerships claim as their goal and function with
their actual activities and products (output), the function-output fit reveals the accuracy
and consistency of these declarations. The underlying assumption is that partnerships
49 Haas, supra note 10.
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that have a good fit between function and output will be better equipped to have a
positive effect on environmental indicators in the end.
To illustrate this reasoning, a partnership that claims to be first and foremost about
implementation (e.g., through building new infrastructure) would be expected to have
measurable output in this area, for example concrete infrastructure programs. A partner-
ship that aims at knowledge transfer would in contrast be expected to have output in the
field of research/publications, communications, or training. If the function and observed
output are not aligned, conclusions about reaching the explicit goals can be drawn.
A Innovation and Technology Transfer
Among the 330 partnerships in GSPD, sixty partnerships focus on energy and climate
issues. Approximately 56 per cent of partnerships focus on innovation, technology trans-
fer, technical implementation, and knowledge dissemination.
The distribution of these functions reveals a concerning picture. On the one hand, the
focus of climate and energy partnerships is more often on transforming infrastructure and
disseminating knowledge. On the other hand, this transformation does not necessarily
prioritize innovation or producing new knowledge. In fact, only eleven partnerships
in this group aim at innovation, whereas others have the goal of disseminating already
existing ideas, knowledge systems, and technologies.
In this context, it is necessary to ask if this apparent dependency for rights, techno-
logies, and episteme is further exacerbated with the inclusion of business and industry
in the partnerships. We have argued elsewhere50 that the decision-making power of
non-state actors as partners is rather limited, although their practices transform global
governance in indirect ways. These indirect influences are important and at times they
reveal intentions of the actors.
Figure 13.1. Goals and functions of climate and energy partnerships.
50 Pattberg et al. 2012, supra note 13; Mert 2015, supra note 7.
Climate Change and Energy-Related Partnerships 301
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316809587.016
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Seattle University Library, on 03 Mar 2019 at 17:58:52, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
For instance, voluntary and flexible governance mechanisms and commitments via
partnerships can be organized on various issues by various actor constellations adhering
to a number of internationally accepted norms. Equally telling are the omissions: At what
level partnerships are not formed, what actors do not get involved, and which issues they
do not address. The fact that partnerships do not emerge on indigenous and non-
technological/low-tech ways of producing energy and generating a low-carbon future
can therefore be contrasted to their more obvious technology transfer and knowledge
dissemination focus.
Furthermore, the UNCSD is not the only platform in which climate and energy
innovation would be transnationally governed. It is therefore of critical importance to
study some of these cases in a more in-depth fashion in qualitative case studies. Although
this qualitative assessment is beyond the purview of this chapter, some of our findings
regarding the prominence of the business partners in the UNCSD climate and energy
sample are set forth in greater detail in the next section.
B Effectiveness
In terms of partnership effectiveness, our findings are mixed. Forty per cent of climate
and energy partnerships are not active or have produced no measurable output at all.
Among the thirty-six partnerships that produce output, 42 per cent have a complete fit
between their promised function and produced output, and 25 per cent have partial fit.
20.00% 28.33%
51.67%
Complete fit no fit Partial fit





Figure 13.3. General characteristics of sample.
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More specifically, sixteen of these partnerships focus on technology transfer. Ten of these
sixteen partnerships have a partial or complete fit between the output they produced and
their indicated goals of technology transfer.
The participatory/democratic deficit refers to the problem that those who are affected
by decisions are rarely and very selectively included in the making of these decisions.
Two indicators are used here to investigate the contribution of climate partnerships
to closing the participatory/democratic deficit in global environmental governance. For
partnerships to play a role in this area, we would expect at least
(1) a balanced distribution of lead partners (i.e., partners with a specific role to
manage, organize and implement the partnership) from industrialised and devel-
oping countries; and from state and non-state actors;
(2) the presence of partners from developing countries and from among underrepre-
sented groups.
This would show that the goal of addressing the participatory deficit is achieved at least
to some degree through the inclusion of those who are often excluded. In the overall
sample, neither of these expectations was found to be the case. Lead actors are often
governments from the industrialized countries, or actors from the public sector at large
(e.g., intergovernmental organizations), whereas the underrepresented groups remain
excluded. Among partnerships focusing only on climate and energy policies, a similar
picture emerges with regard to the participatory deficit. The first aspect that falls under
the heading of participation is the concrete distribution of lead partners among state and
non-state actors (see Figure 13.5). In short, climate partnerships are predominantly led
by state actors, UN organizations, or other intergovernmental agencies, accounting for
60.2 per cent of all partnerships in the sample. While state involvement might be
considered a positive sign in other issue areas, the climate change governance arena
now critically depends on the involvement of non-state actors to implement the Paris
Agreement. We therefore would expect a broader representation of these actors in the
actual implementation stages.
This observation is comparable to the overall WSSD sample.
What is noteworthy in this context, however, is the level of business involvement:
Climate and energy partnerships have a much larger number of business actors as lead
Figure 13.4. Lead partners among state and non-state actors.
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partners (8.2 per cent) compared to the overall sample (3.2 per cent). Furthermore,
analyzing the geographical origin of lead partners in climate and energy partnerships (see
Figure 13.6), we observe that a majority of state-led partnerships have an OECD country
(state agency or government) as a lead partner. Inversely, if the lead partner is a govern-
ment, 82 per cent of the time it is an OECD country, demonstrating the dominance of
Northern state actors.
Finally, among climate and energy partnerships, the group of countries that make up
most of the implementation area is the OECD. This observation calls into question a
number of assumptions frequently encountered in the literature. Far from being opera-
tive in those regions with the most pressing needs, partnerships seem to favor implemen-
tation contexts that are characterized by institutional stability and the rule-of-law.
Conclusions
Sustainability partnerships take on an essential role within the context of managing the
many different kinds of resources that have become market-based, including access to








Figure 13.5. Lead partners in climate and energy partnerships.













Figure 13.6. Countries of implementation.
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change and energy is being shaped and re-oriented to refer to very different sets of activi-
ties, which is highly dependent on forms of hybrid governance in the context of the UN
mandates on climate and energy, intellectual property, and environmental issues.
In this chapter, we have examined whether public–private partnerships focus on techni-
cal implementation of existing technologies, technology transfer, knowledge dissemina-
tion, and innovation. We ask whether such partnerships are effective in tackling the
problems they were set up to tackle. To this end, the chapter utilized a multi-year research
project on the emergence and effectiveness of PPPs for sustainable development and the
corresponding large-N database (GSPD) to understand the role and relevance of PPPs in
contemporary global environmental governance. The empirical focus of this chapter was
on partnerships working in the climate change and/or energy field.
As stated in the chapter’s introduction, three issues are of particular relevance. First,
despite the transformative potential of technological and social innovations for sustain-
ability, neither type of innovation is a dominant function (at least so far) of climate and
energy partnerships. Second, significant issues pertain to the democratic legitimacy of
individual partnerships, the technologies transferred, the resulting innovation regimes,
and their overall orchestration by the UNCSD. Third and finally, the climate and energy
partnerships surveyed here show alarmingly low levels of potential effectiveness to date.
Recent and renewed attention to the partnership model in the climate governance
arena can be found in the non-state actor zone of climate action to the UNFCCC, which
is crowded with PPPs.51 Thus it is important to suggest some institutional safeguards for
minimum effectiveness and accountability.52 We want to stress in particular the neces-
sity for a critical screening mechanism that could ensure transparency, accountability,
co-benefits, and fit with the 2030 Agenda, as well as ensuring adequate levels of partici-
pation for marginalized actors in this multi-stakeholder institutional framework. Finally,
while perhaps politically challenging in the current situation, the possibility of deregis-
tering failed and underperforming partnerships from the UN registries should be consi-
dered. These measures would ensure that the full potential of PPPs for sustainable
development could still be reached in the 2030 Agenda process, which is still at its early
stages of implementation.
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